In this paper I study the relation between real wage rigidity (RWR) and nominal price and wage rigidities. I show that in a standard DSGE model RWR is mainly affected by the two nominal rigidities and not by the other structural parameters.
Introduction
The recent years have shown an increased interest in the issue of RWR. This has to do with the fact that RWR has been identified as one plausible element that can be added to standard models in order to improve their explanatory power. Hall (2005) and Milgrom and Hall (2008) , e.g., have shown that RWR offers a straightforward solution to the famous "Shimer puzzle" (i.e. the relatively large fluctuations of unemployment).
Blanchard and Galí (2007) , on the other hand, have forcefully argued that RWR is a reasonable way to break the "divine coincidence" of standard New Keynesian models, to reestablish more plausible effects of disinflations and more realistic trade-offs for monetary policy.
As far as the reasons behind the rigidities of real wages are concerned, however, there does not exist much agreement. Blanchard and Katz (1999) , in an early contribution, present a model in which unemployment benefits and wages react differently to changes in productivity growth. Hall (2005) , on the other hand, uses a model where RWR follows from the existence of social norms while Hall and Milgrom (2008) present an argument based on sequential (real) wage bargaining. Blanchard and Galí (2007) , finally, simply assume that the real wage ω t is rigid for whatever reason and can be written as: ω t = γω t−1 + (1 − γ)mrs t , where γ is their measure of RWR. In an appendix they motivate this short-cut formulation by referring to a model with "real wage staggering". Interestingly, however, none of these papers deals explicitly with the possibility that the RWR could simply be understood as the consequence of two nominal rigidities: a nominal price and a nominal wage rigidity. This parsimonous explanation is, however, a core element of New Keynesian (and also old Keynesian) models of the business cycle and it is the starting point of this paper. My derivations are based on the model by Erceg, Henderson and Levin [EHL] (2000) . This is the benchmark model in the DSGE literature where both nominal price and nominal wage rigidities are introduced via Calvo contracts (Calvo, 1983 ). The EHL model leads to a solution of the form ω t = δ * ω t−1 + f (output gap, supply shocks), where f (·) is a linear function of the stated variables. Since the output gap itself can be expressed as a function of the marginal rate of substitution this equation is in fact close to the short-cut relation in Blanchard and Galí (2007) . The parameter δ * is a natural measure of RWR in the EHL model. I show that the two nominal rigidities are the main determinants of the degree of RWR and that δ * reacts rather insensitive to changes in the other structural parameters. The solutions of the forward-looking New Keynesian model can also be written in a form that is very similar to a backward-looking Phillips curve specification. I show that the derived expression is closely related to the traditional "triangle" model (cf. Gordon, 1998) and that the weight of past inflation in this expression is identical to the measure of RWR δ * .
Empirical data on wage-setting practices (e.g. Druant et al., 2009 ) typically contradict the basic assumption of Calvo wage contracts that the hazard rate of wage changes is constant. On the contrary, the majority of agreements seems to follow a predetermined pattern with given contract lengths of one to two years. Furthermore, existing data also suggest that in many countries new contracts are clustered in certain months (mostly in January). In order to account for these important institutional characteristics of actual wage-setting practices I also solve the EHL model under the assumption of Taylor wage contracts, i.e. contracts with a fixed and predetermined length (cf. Taylor, 1980) . In addition, I also allow for the fact that the sectors might be of different size, i.e. that there might be a clustering of contracts. The solution to this model is somewhat more involved than the one for the model with Calvo wage contracts. It can, however, again be written in a way that contains an analogous measure of RWR. Comparing the different measures of RWR leads to two conclusions. First, ceteris paribus the model with Taylor wage contracts involves a considerable smaller degree of RWR than the model with Calvo contracts. Second, asymmetries in the sector size reduce RWR in the model with Taylor contracts. In the case where one sector subsumes 10% of all contracts the RWR is only about half than in the symmetric case and it approaches zero as one sector starts to dominate the economy.
In the second part of the paper I use the implications of the theoretical model in order to study whether the crucial mechanism of the EHL model corresponds to the available empirical evidence. For this purpose, I use recent survey evidence from the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) of the ECB. In particular, I take the data on average durations of prices and wages and on the clustering of wage contracts from Durant et al. (2009) for 15 European countries. Using standard values for the other structural parameters, I can then calculate the measure for RWR that is implied by the theoretical model under different modelling assumptions.
3
The average model-based estimate of annual RWR comes out as 0.33 which is fairly close to existing empirical evidence (e.g. 0.29 in Abbritti and Weber, 2008) . 4 On the first sight this result might thus suggest that the parsimonious explanation is in fact capable of producing a reasonable amount of RWR and that one does not need more complicated mechanisms based on detailed features of wage-setting practices. This conclusion has to be qualified, however, along three dimension. First, the use of the more realistic Taylor contracts reduces the average model-based estimate of RWR to 0.11 which is below the values typially found in the empirical literature. The impact of clustering, on the other hand, is found to have only a moderate impact on the size of RWR. Second, the variation of RWR implied by the model is much smaller than the one found in the data. Using Calvo wage contracts most magnitudes range between 0.3 and 0.35 with a standard deviation of 0.04 while the variation is considerably larger in empirical estimations (SD: 0.17 in Abbritti and Weber, 2008) . Third, for both types of wage contracts the implied ranking of countries is at odds with the existing empirical evidence.
For the latter finding I use four sources of evidence. First, I take the empirical estimates on RWR in Abbritti and Weber ( 2008) on 13 countries. Unfortunately, they do not show a large overlap with the 15 countries covered in the WDN sample. Therefore I also consider evidence on alternative measures that are closely related to δ * : the sensitivity of the RWR with respect to the output gap (Clar et al., 2007) , the speed of adjustment in an error-correction mechanism (Arpai and Pichelmann, 2007) and a measure that is similar to the sacrifice ratio (Richardson et al., 2000) . It can be shown that the solution of the EHL model can be transformed in various ways such that it leads to expressions that closely resemble these empirical counterparts. When comparing the rankings based on the theoretical model with the rankings based on the surrogate measures from the empirical literature I find weak correlations. What is more, the correlation goes into the wrong direction for all four measures and in one case it is even statistically significant. It is certainly likely that part of this missing (or wrongly signed) correlation is related to problems with data compatibility and with the precise empirical specifications. Nevertheless, the fact that the correlation is absent for all measures raises some doubts about the accuracy and completeness of the basic EHL model. This is furthermore emphasized by the fact that the cross-country variation of the model-based measures is much smaller than the one found in the empirical literature. Taken together, RWR can thus be only partly explained by the interaction of two nominal rigidities.
The results from the empirical part suggest that important features are missing from the basic model that are crucial for cross-country differences in the transmission mechanism and in RWR. These characteristics are likely to be related to labour market and financial institutions. The incorporation of such institutional details into standard DSGE models has been started recently (cf. Gertler et al., 2008) 5 and the results of the present paper suggest that this strand of literature might also offer important insights for the explanation of cross-country differences. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section I present the standard EHL model with Calvo price and wage contracts and I derive the measure of RWR. In section 3 I study how the introduction of Taylor wage contracts and of asymmetric sector sizes changes the results. In section 4 I discuss the evidence of the WDN and I calculate various measures of RWR that are implied by the theoretical model based on the average duration of prices and wages for 15 European countries. Section 5 compares these figures to the existing empirical evidence and section 6 concludes. . In order to facilitate the comparison with the existing literature I use the exact set-up and notation of the model that is presented in chapter 6 of Galí (2008) where one can also find details on the derivation of the linearized solutions of the microfounded model. The model assumes that there exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms that produce differentiated products where ε p stands for the elasticity of substitution among the product varieties. There exists a Calvo constraint on price-setting and each period only a fraction (1 − θ p ) can reset their price while a fraction θ p leaves the price unchanged (and where the probability of reoptimizing is independent of the history of past price changes). The average duration of a price is thus given by 1 1−θp . Nominal wage rigidity is introduced in a similar fashion. In particular, it is assumed that each household is specialized in one particular type of labor for which he is the monopolistic supplier and where each firm needs all differentiated labor types to produce its differentiated product.
Also households are subject to the Calvo constraint and in each period only a fraction (1 − θ w ) can freely adjust the wage rate. The elasticity of substitution among the different types of labor is denoted by ε w . The production function for firm i is given by:
index of labor inputs used in the production of good Y t (i). The period utility function of a representative household is given by: U(C, N) =
. Galí (2008) shows that the dynamic equilibrium of the model can be summarized in 5 equations:
where π p t = p t − p t−1 and π w t = w t − w t−1 denote price and wage inflation, respectively, i t is the nominal interest rate, ω t ≡ w t − p t is the real wage,ỹ t ≡ y t − y n t is the output gap andω t ≡ ω t − ω n t the real wage gap. The level of natural output y n t that is used in the definition of the output gap refers to the equilibrium level of output that would prevail in the absence of both price and wage rigidities. Similarly, the natural real wage ω n t and the natural real interest rate r n t correspond to the real wage rate and the real interest rate in the absence of both nominal rigidities. These natural levels can be derived as:
where
is the log of the desired markup of firms and whereω n ≡ log(1 − α) − µ p is defined as the real wage that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities and in the absence of technological shocks. Equation (1) is a New Keynesian Phillips curve where inflation now also depends on the real wage gap. Equation (2) is a similar equation for wage inflation with the only difference that a positive wage gap will decrease wage inflation by moderating wage claims. (3) is an identity relating various measures of the real wage and inflation, (4) is the usual forward-looking IS curve and (5) is the monetary policy rule.
The various parameters in (1) to (8) are given as follows:
and φ p , φ w and φ y are non-negative coefficients that give the strength with which the central bank is assumed to adjust the nominal interest rate in response to price inflation, wage inflation and the output gap, respectively. 7 Furthermore, ρ ≡ − log β where β is the discount factor. The technology shocks a t and the interest rate shock v t are given by the AR(1) processes:
where 
Measuring real wage rigidity
I am are interested in the implications of the model for real wage rigidity. For this purpose it is helpful to subtract (1) from (2). Defining real wage inflation as π
Using the definitions for π ω t ,ω t and ω t one can derive from (12) a second-order difference equation for the real wage ω t :
7 See Galí (2008, p. 128) for conditions on φ p , φ w and φ y for which one gets an unique equilibrium. Equation (13) can be solved to get:
The root δ is given by:
whereλ ≡ 1 1+β+λw+λp . δ is a first approximate measure for the extent of real wage rigidity in the EHL model. It is, however, not the ultimate solution since also future variables that are present in (14) might depend on past levels of the real wage. In order to derive the general solution one has to use the complete model, in particular the assumptions about how the output gapsỹ t+s are determined.
Real wage rigidities under the assumption of exogenous output
Before turning to the solution that is implied by the complete EHL model (that includes the forward-looking IS-curve (4) and the monetary policy rule (5) to pin down the values ofỹ t+s ) I want to start with the simple assumption that the output is exogenously given and always equal to its natural level y n t , i.e.ỹ t = 0, ∀t.
9 Using (8) and (9) in (14) it follows that:
In the case of exogenous output the root δ captures the degree of real wage rigidity. One can use (15) . 9 This model thus closely resembles a RBC model with fixed labor supply and a real wage rigidity (caused by the existence of two nominal rigidities).
10 If the supply shock a t is persistent (ρ a = 0) then the estimation of the autocorrelation function of the real wage will of course also show a positive lag (cf. Rabanal and Ramírez, 2005) . This persistence is, however, only a consequence of the persistence of the supply shock. In order to emphasize the genuine In the next section I will show that this conclusion still holds for the more general case where the output gap is not assumed to be equal to zero but where it is given by (4) and (5). In fact, it will come out that the degree of real wage rigidity in the more general framework is also quantitatively similar to δ.
Real wage rigidities in the EHL model
For the full EHL model consisting of equations (1) to (8) as the measure of real wage rigidity in the EHL model since it is closely related to the existing literature and allows for better comparisons among different specifications.
The degree of (annual) RWR is illustrated in Figure 1 that also includes -as a comparison -the (annual) RWR from the model with exogenous output (cf. (16)). For the illustrations I use the standard calibration of the parameters as in chapter 6 of Galí (2008) . The only difference is that Galí (2008) defines a quarter as the basic time unit while I use a semester for this purpose. This is done to later alleviate comparisons to a model with two-period Taylor wage contracts (in particular when sector sizes are asymmetric).
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In using a semester as the basic time unit one has to be careful in correctly calibrating the parameters that govern the degree of nominal rigidity. In particular, an average price duration of 3 quarters corresponds to θ p = 1/3 while an average wage duration of 4 quarters corresponds to θ w = 1/2. These are the baseline values for the duration of price real wage rigidity I will focus in this paper mostly on the case where ρ a = ρ v = 0.
11 It is also shown in appendix A.2 how to write these policy functions in an equivalent way in terms of deviations of the real wage from the steady state valueω n . In particular for
In section 3.3 I discuss some issues related to the structure of timing more extensively. and wage contracts used by Galí (2008) and I will refer to this in the following as the "baseline calibration".
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Insert Figure 1 about here Figure 1 shows that in the absence of nominal price rigidity (θ p = 0) the real wage rigidity is zero. The same is true for the case of completely flexible wages (θ w = 0) where δ * and δ also approach zero. For the baseline calibration one gets a sizable degree of annual RWR given by (δ * ) 2 = 0.288 or (δ) 2 = 0.287, respectively (which corresponds to a quarter-on-quarter RWR of 0.73).
As shown in the appendix, the measure of RWR is independent of the autocorrelation of shocks ρ a and ρ v . Furthermore, δ * reacts only very weakly to changes in the parameters σ, ϕ, φ π and φ y . The largest effects one can observe for changes in α, ε p and ε w . 14 For the usual range of parameter values, however, the measure of annual RWR is fairly stable and stays between 0.25 and 0.3. Overall these robustness checks show that the main determinants of the degree of RWR are the two nominal rigidities. A related issue is whether the degree of RWR that is implied by the baseline calibration is reasonable and in line with the empirical evidence. I will come back to this question in section 4.
13 The rest of the parameters is calibrated as: α = 1/3, β = 0.98 (corresponding to an annual real interest rate of roughly 4%), σ = 1, ϕ = 1, ε p = ε w = 6, φ π = 1.5 and φ y = φ w = 0.
14 For σ between 0.5 and 5, δ * decreases from 0.29 to 0.28, for ϕ between 1 and 5 it increases from 0.29 to 0.32 and for φ π between 1.1 and 10 and φ y between 0 and 1 it stays constant at δ * = 0.29. On the other hand, δ * is 0.1 for α = 0 and it is close to 0.55 as α approaches 1. For ε p (ε w ) close to one gets values of (δ * ) 2 = 0.16 ((δ * ) 2 = 0.21) which increases to (δ * ) 2 = 0.34 ((δ * ) 2 = 0.31) for ε p = 10 (ε w = 10).
The extreme values for α, ε p and ε w are, however, not typical for the calibration of DSGE models.
The main findings of the last two subsections can be summarized as follows: Result 1 emphasizes in a concentrated form the importance of complementarities (cf. Ascari, 2003; Huang and Liu, 2002) . Nominal price rigidity without nominal wage rigidity as well as nominal wage rigidity without nominal price rigidity will result in completely flexible real wages (δ * = 0). Only the interplay between the two rigidities causes real wage rigidity. By the same token, Figure 1 also nicely illustrates that one class of stickiness increases the size of overall persistence holding the degree of the other stickiness constant.
Inflation persistence and a backward-looking Phillips curve
The rational expectations solution to the EHL model can be transformed into an expression that resembles a traditional, backward-looking Phillips curve. This formulation is particularly useful for empirical analyses and also for the later comparisons between the models with Calvo and with Taylor wage contracts. In appendix A.2 it is shown that one can use the solution of the model to derive an equation of the form:
where f (·) is a linear function of the listed variables. Equation (18) is in fact fairly similar to the more traditional "triangle" model (cf. Gordon, 1998) in which the current rate of inflation is written as a function of past inflation and of current and past levels of demand factors (output gap, cyclical unemployment) and supply factors (oil price shocks, import price shocks etc.). Interestingly, the coefficient on the lagged inflation term is identical to the degree of real wage rigidity in (17). An implication of this finding is stated as the following result.
Result 3 The degree of intrinsic inflation persistence is the same as the degree of RWR. If there is no RWR than there will also be no intrinsic inflation persistence.
A similar result has also been derived by Blanchard and Galí (2007, 51f.) who have shown that the presence of their (assumed) RWR leads to intrinsic inflation inertia.
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The model with nominal price rigiditiesà la Calvo and nominal wage rigiditiesà la Taylor
The EHL model is based on Calvo wage contracts and Calvo price contracts. This is the standard assumption that dominates the DSGE literature. In recent years, however, this assumption has also been criticized as being restrictive and implausible. In particular, it has been argued that a constant hazard rate for wage contracts is at odds with the empirical evidence (cf. Gottfries and Söderberg, 2008) . Survey data by the WDN has documented, e.g., that most wage contracts have a clearly specified time length and that more than 60% are written for exactly one year. What is more, it has also been shown that wage changes are not spread uniformly over the year but are typically clustered in certain periods. 54% of the firms asked in the WDN survey have indicated that they carry out wage changes in a particular month (most of them in January). 16 In order to be able to take the empirical evidence on the fixed length of contracts and the clustering of wage agreements into account one has to move beyond the convenient but restictive framework of Calvo wage contracts. Accordingly, in this section I am going to present a model with
Taylor wage contracts and with asymmetric sector sizes. This framework allows to study the impact of institutional details on the implied degree of RWR and it can be used for cross-country comparisons.
Wage-setting in the model with Taylor wage contracts
I use a simple two period Taylor model where the basic time-unit is again one semester. The total workforce is divided into two sectors where sector A negotiates the wage in When compared to the model of section 2 one has to change two equations (see appendix A.3). The following wage-setting equation takes the place of (2): (3) one has to use the following definition of aggregate wages:
The complete model is now given by the five equations (1), (4), (5), (19) and (20).
Real wage rigidity in the model with Taylor wage contracts
One can again use standard methods to solve the model. In appendix A.3 I discuss the solution and I derive a number of useful transformations. A direct comparison between the solutions and the degrees of RWR for the formulations with Calvo and with Taylor contracts is, however, not straightforward. First, even in the case with symmetric sector sizes (i.e. s A = s B = 1/2) the Taylor model does not lead to a formulation where the average real wageω t depends just onω t−1 , a t andỹ t (as in (17)). 17 In particular, for the case with symmetric Taylor wage contractsω t depends
18 17 I have to writeω t for the average real wage in order to distinguish it from the real wage of the two individual sectors. In particular: Second, for the case of asymmetric sector sizes the period-on-period RWR differs between the two subperiods and depends on the sector that sets the new wage. In order to deal with these difficulties and to allow for comparisons I use a year-on-year formulation. In appendix A.3 it is shown that the evolution of the average real wage can be written as:
The coefficientδ measures the (year-on-year) rigidity of the average real wage. It is the same in both sectors of the economy, independent of which sector sets the new wage. The reaction ofω i t to supply shocks, output gaps and inflation rates is, however, different in the two subperiods (as indicated by the indexation of the function f i (·)). This year-on-year measure of RWRδ can be compared with the year-on-year measure of RWR in the Calvo model (given by (δ * ) 2 ).
The correspondence betweenδ and (δ * ) 2 is further emphasized if one again derives a backward-looking Phillips curve for the model with Taylor wage contracts. In appendix A.3 I show how it can be written as:
Using (18) one observes that for the model with Calvo contracts the expression for year-on-year inflation persistence has exactly the same form as (22):
In Figure 2 I plotδ and (δ * ) 2 for the baseline calibration and for three assumptions about the sector size (s A = 1/2, s A = 1/4, s A = 1/10).
Insert Figure 2 about here
The findings can be summarized in the following results.
Result 4 For the same average durations of price and wage contracts, the assumption of Taylor wage contracts implies a considerably lower degree of real wage rigidity than the assumption of Calvo wage contracts.
Result 5 For the case of Taylor wage contracts the assumption of asymmetric sector sizes (s A < 1/2) lowers the degree of real wage rigidity.
As far as result 4 is concerned one gets for the baseline calibration (with θ p = 1/3) that the annual RWR implied by the model with Calvo contracts is given by (δ * ) 2 = 0.29 while for Taylor contracts it isδ = 0.1 (for s A = 1/2). The reason for the considerably lower rigidity in the model with Taylor contracts is the fact that under the latter assumption there is an exactly given duration for every contract. In the Calvo framework, on the other hand, some contracts might last for a very long time span. This (unrealistic) feature considerably increases the extent of intrinsic persistence. This fact is known from the literature (cf. Dixon and Kara, 2006) although it is mostly ignored when calibrating the models. Less well-known is the impact of asymmetries as stated in result 5. The RWR decreases considerably (fromδ = 0.1 (for s A = 1/2) toδ = 0.085 (for s A = 1/4) andδ = 0.05 (for s A = 1/10)) when the share of wage-setting firms is not spread evenly over the year. Since such asymmetries are in fact characteristic for almost all European countries (see section 4) this should be taken into account when calibrating the model. Taken the two results together they suggest that the assumption of Calvo wage contracts does not seem to be innocuous. In particular, it might be highly misleading to simply translate the available information about the average duration of wage contracts into a parameter θ w that is then used in a model with Calvo wage contracts. Institutional details about the wage-setting practices matter and they can have a considerable impact on the implied degree of persistence.
Discussion of the time structure
Before turning to the empirical data I want to briefly deal with two issues that are related to the time structure of the model. First, how large is the bias introduced by working with a semester as the basic time-unit in both the Calvo and the Taylor model? Second, is it possible to stick to the standard Taylor structure of two-period-staggering while still allowing for an average wage duration that is longer or shorter than one year? The latter question is particularly important when trying to match the model with the empirical data.
In appendix B I deal with both questions and the interested reader is referred to this part of the paper. I show there that these are in fact nonnegligible issues. As far as the first issue is concerned, appendix B.1 illustrates, e.g., that the baseline calibration of a model with Calvo wage contracts and with semesters as the basic time units underestimates the RWR by 37% when compared to a model with quarters as the basic time unit. The underestimation is even larger when it is compared to a model with months (52%) or days (54%) as the basic time unit. Furthermore, if economies differ with respect to both price and wage duration then it might even be the case that their ranking is affected by the choice of the basic time unit.
As far as the second timing issue is concerned I present in appendix B.2 a straightforward method to allow in the Taylor framework for average wage durations that are different from one year. The main idea behind the procedure is to redefine the length of the basic time unit as one half of the average wage duration. The time discount factor and the parameter capturing the degree of price stickiness have then to be adapted such as to conform to this new timing. The results suggest that the approximate method will lead to plausible results as long as average price duration is not too much shorter than average wage duration.
Overall, the analysis of these two issues indicates that the assumptions concerning the time structure are not completely innocuous. In particular, they can affect both the magnitude of the estimated RWRs and their ranking in cross-country comparisons. These caveats must be kept in mind when using the WDN survey data for international comparisons.
Survey evidence on nominal rigidities and what they imply for real wage rigidity
A natural question is to what extent the standard EHL model is able to explain empirical regularities. The current literature mostly focuses on the ability of the microfounded model to produce an adjustment process that is sufficiently close to its real-world counterpart. For this purpose one commonly employs the study of impulse response functions. As argued above, the measure for RWR offers an alternative variable that can be used to evaluate whether the EHL model captures the essential features of real-world persistence and transmission channels. To this end I will in the following present survey evidence on price and wage stickiness for a number of European countries. Using this information on nominal rigidities together with the other baseline parameter values leads to estimates for the degree of real wage rigidity in these countries. These numbers (or at least their ranking) can then be compared with the findings of the existing empirical literature that has come up with estimations for real wage rigidities or with related concepts. This will reveal whether the EHL model and its implied explanation for the existence of RWRs is in line with the cross-country evidence.
I use the results from firms surveys that have been conducted in a number of European countries in the context of the ECB's Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). Aggregate data are presented in Druant et al. (2009) that also contains an extensive discussion of the results and a comparison to related evidence from the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) and from Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) . So far, the final results concerning the countryspecific data on the average duration of price and of wage contracts and the asymmetry in wage-setting are not yet available. I have used the reported raw data to calculate crude measures for the average duration of prices and wages which are contained in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 
about here
The figures in columns (1) and (2) indicate that the degree of price stickiness is rather similar across European countries. It ranges from 8.4 months (for Lithuania) to 10.4 months (for Hungary) and for the Euro-area countries the span is even smaller (from 9 to 10 months). The duration of wages is on average higher than the one for prices and also cross-country differences are more pronounced. This is the expected result given the differences in wage-setting institutions and practices. Wage duration is shortest for Slovenia, Lithuania and Spain (around 12 months) and ranges up to 15 months for countries (4) to (6) show the implications of the theoretical for the degree of real wage rigidity when the data in the first three columns and the baseline calibration is used.
like the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Poland. Italy seems to be a special (and rather unusual) case since it has an average duration of wages of almost two years.
I have also used the survey data in Druant et al. (2009) In columns (4) to (6) I calculate the country-specific degrees of RWR that correspond to these price and wage durations. I report the numbers when using the baseline calibration for the model with Calvo wage contracts ((δ * ) 2 ) and for the model with symmetric (δ sym. ) and with asymmetric (δ asym. ) Taylor wage contracts. Figure 3 compares the estimations that are based on the model with Calvo wage contracts ((δ * ) 2 ) with the one based on (symmetric) Taylor contracts (δ sym. ).
Insert Figure 3 about here
In line with the results of section 3 the annual RWR based on the model with Taylor contracts is considerably lower (average: 0.11) than the one based on the model with Calvo contracts (average: 0.33). The ranking of countries is not drastically affected by the assumptions about wage-setting although their are some notable changes in position (involving, e.g., the Netherlands and Poland). For either assumption, however, one observes remarkably small differences in the implied RWR for the large bulk of countries.
For Calvo contracts most values are in the interval between 0.3 and 0.35 and for Taylor contract they range from 0.1 to 0.125. Only Slovenia and Hungary stand out at the lower end and Hungary and Italy at the higher end. It remains to be seen whether the country-specific differences in clustering will change these general conclusions.
Comparison to the existing empirical literature
It is interesting to compare the model-based measures for RWR with existing empirical evidence. There does not seem to exist a long literature on this issue. Blanchard and Galí (2007), e.g., do not provide an estimate or a "reasonable" value for the (assumed) magnitude of RWR. In discussing the results they use illustrative values between 0.5 and 0.9 (for a quarter-on-quarter basis). Abbritti and Weber (2008) find an average value for quarterly RWR of 0.7, which corresponds to an annual RWR of 0.29. This is broadly in line with the average value of (δ * ) 2 = 0.33 that is implied by the EHL model for the 15 countries in the EHL model.
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A comparison of these numbers would thus suggest that the EHL model is in fact capable of explaining the extent of empirically observable RWR. This claim has to be qualified, however, in three dimensions. First, the high degree of implied RWR only emerges if one assumes Calvo wage contracts which is -as argued above -not in line with the existing evidence on wage-setting in Europe. Second, the variations in RWR implied by the theoretical models are much smaller than their empirical counterparts.
While the estimates in Abbritti and Weber (2008) show a standard deviation of 0.17 it is only 0.04 for the estiamtes based on Calvo contracts. Third, one should also move beyond the study of summary statistics and investigate whether the observed ranking of countries in terms of empirical estimates of RWR is in line with the rankings that come out of the model. The only study which I know of that contains comparable estimates of RWR for a number of countries is the above-mentioned paper by Abbritti and Weber (2008) . The results of this paper are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 about here Unfortunately, the 13 countries in Abbritti and Weber (2008) do not show large overlaps with the 15 countries of the WDN survey. In particular, only 4 countries are included in both samples. Furthermore, the estimates in Abbritti and Weber (2008) are based on a specific empirical model and it is thus interesting to broaden and contrast the analysis with related measures that reflect a country's degree of real rigidity. In particular, one can use various transformations and equivalent expressions of the EHL model to derive relations that correspond to empirical specifications for which cross-country results are available. In appendix C I show in detail how the model-based measure of RWR is related to these alternative measures.
21 In particular, I refer to three measures: (i) the sensitivity of the real wage with respect to the output gap, (ii) the speed of adjustment in an error-correction mechanism and (iii) a measure that resembles a sacrifice ratio. In the appendix I show that each of these measures is perfectly related to δ * when either θ p or θ w are held constant and still closely related if one allows for plausible country-specific variations in θ p and θ w . In the following I briefly present these three measures and their relation to the degree of RWR δ * .
The degree of RWR and the sensitivity to the output gap
There exists a voluminous literature on wage curve estimations for a large number of countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005) . A good part of this literature is summarized (via meta-analyses) in a paper by Clar et al. (2007) . In particular, they report and analyze measures of the parameter ι which is defined as measuring the reaction of the real wage to the level of the unemployment rate u t , i.e. ω t = . . . + ιu t . In Table 2 , columns (3) and (4), I report the values for the European countries contained in Clar et al. (2007) . , Table A2 ). These papers refer to different countries and thus not all of the cells could be filled. The rankings are specified in such a way that higher numbers correspond to "more rigid" countries.
The coefficient ι is related to Ψ ω 5 in (17), i.e. the sensitivity of the real wage with respect to the output gap. Both reflect how strongly the real wage reacts to changes in real activity. Furthermore, in appendix C.1 I show that Ψ ω 5 is closely related to the measure of RWR δ * . The more rigid real wages the smaller also their reaction to changes in the output gap or in unemployment. The correlation is perfect for constant values of θ p or θ w and still fairly high for reasonable variations.
The speed of error-correction
The EHL model can also be used to derive an error-correction formulation that is similar to the specifications used in the empirical literature (cf. Blanchard and Katz, 1999; Bardsen et al., 2004) . In appendix A.2 it is shown how one can use the solution for π p t together with (2) and (3) to get:
The change in nominal wages π w t depends on expected inflation E t π p t+1 , the output gap y t , the size of the productivity shock a t and the error-correction-term (ω t−1 −ω n ), wherē ω n stands for the real wage in the absence of shocks and rigidities. The coefficient Φ 1 measures how strongly wage inflation is affected by deviations of the past real wage from the equilibrium value. In appendix C.2 I show that Φ 1 is closely (positively) related to the RWR δ * .
There exists an empirical literature that has estimated equations that resemble (23). Blanchard and Katz (1999), e.g., arrive at a fairly similar specification, although they derive it in a completely different model without nominal rigidities where the source of RWR (and the error-correction-term) is a direct influence of productivity on the wage and the reservation wage. They report that for annual data a value of Φ 1 = 0.25 is characteristic for European countries while a value of Φ 1 = 0 is typical for the US. Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) use the modeling framework of Blanchard and Katz (1999) to estimate an error-correction model for a large number of European countries.
In Table 2 , columns (5) and (6) I report the estimates of Φ 1 that are contained in Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) and I also give the country ranking.
The sacrifice ratio
As a last measure of "real rigidity" one can focus on the available cross-country evidence of the sacrifice ratio. For the sake of comparisons, one can use impulse response functions of the model to derive a parallel measure that resembles (somewhat loosely) a sacrifice ratio. This is discussed in appendix C.3. The measure is defined as sr = Richardson et al. (2000) contains estimations for the sacrifice ration for 21 OECD countries. The empirical specifications in the paper are in fact fairly similar to the theoretical equation (18) and they include an unemployment gap (comparable toỹ t ) and supply shocks (comparable to a t ). The difference is that the specifications involve variable lags for both inflation and the unemployment gap while the theoretical model clearly determines the lag structure.
In Table 2 , columns (7) and (8) I report the values for the sacrifice ratio and the country rank contained in Richardson et al. (2000) .
Comparing the empirical measures
All of the discussed measures are not perfect and the relation between the theoretical model and the used empirical specifications is sometimes rather loose. It would therefore not make much sense to compare the exact numerical values and I will rather focus on the ranking of countries.
In Figure 4 I contrast the implied values for RWR in the model with Calvo wage contracts (cf. column (4) in Table 1 ) to the four empirical estimates of real wage rigidity and real rigidities, as reported in Table 2 . One observes that the correlation is rather weak and that furthermore for all four cases it has the wrong (negative) sign. 23 When analyzing and interpreting these pictures one must, however, take into account that for 22 This can only be understood as an approximate measure. In particular, one has to be careful in referring to processes that involve a permanent disinflation in this model since its main equations are based on log-linearizations around a zero inflation steady state (cf. Ascari and Merkl, 2007; Ascari and Ropele, 2009) .
23 The (wrong) correlation between the error-correction term and the model-based measure is even significant (p-value: 0.013). Similar results emerge (not shown) if one uses the RWRs from the model with Taylor wage contracts or with shorter basic time units. Also the use of the numerical values instead of the rankings do not improve the correlations (on the contrary). It remains to be seen how the RWRs from the model with asymmetric wage contracts will change the pictures. (1), (3), (5) and (7) in Table 2 ). The rankings are again specified in such a way that higher numbers correspond to "more rigid" countries. most countries the model-based values for RWR are very similar and thus the scatter plot of rankings might be quite sensitive to small changes in the underlying assumptions. Nevertheless, even Italy, the country with the highest estimate of RWR in my sample, is ranked among the most flexible countries in all four existing empirical studies.
Insert Figure 4 about here
There are two ways to explain the negative correlations in Figure 4 . First, one could argue that the empirical measures are not really comparable and that they themselves might be based on misspecified models. The second explanation would be, however, that RWR is not only a function of two nominal rigidities (as assumed in the EHL model) but rather related to other institutional (and country-specific) particularities.
In order to investigate the first possibility, Figure 5 plots the ranking of countries according to the four empirical measures against each other.
Insert (Clar et al., 2007) , the sacrifice ratio (Richardson et al., 2000) , the error-correction-term (Arpai and Pichelmann, 2007) and real wage rigidity (Abbritti and Weber, 2008) . The (absolute values of the) rank correlation coefficients are 0.48, 0.41, 0.01, 0.2, 0.03 and 0.31, respectively. Only the first one is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Five of the six parwise comparisons point into the right direction, although the correlation is mostly weak. Only the sensitivity of the real wage with respect to unemployment is significantly positively related to the sacrifice ratio (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient [SRCC]: 0.48 with a p-value of 0.027). The smaller the decrease in the real wage in reaction to an increase in the unemployment rate the higher the sacrifice ratio. This result is in line with intuition and also with the prediction of the theoretical model. As far as the other comparisons are concerned it should be noted that the correlation of RWR to the alternative measures is particularly weak. This, however, might also have to do with the small number of observations for this variable.
Taken together, the evidence from the pairwise comparisons is rather mixed and one cannot exclude the possibility that the results are driven by incompatibility of the different data sources or by problems with the underlying structure of the empirical specifications.
On the total, the results from the cross-country comparisons of the model-based measures with the empirical evidence suggests, however, that the basic EHL model does not give a complete description of real-world economic structures. I come back to this in the concluding remarks.
Conclusion
In this paper I have used a standard DSGE model to show that the synchronous presence of a nominal price and a nominal wage rigidity leads to real wage rigidity. Furthermore, I have shown that the institutional details of wage determination can have a considerable impact on the extent of RWR. If wages are assumed to be set for a fixed length of time (Taylor wage contracts) then the resulting real wages are much less rigid than in the case of Calvo wage contracts with an identical average duration. The phenomenon of clustering of wage agreements further diminishes RWR. Since wage contracts of a predetermined length and wage clustering are a prevalent feature of European wage-setting institutions it seems imperative to include these elements into the set-up and the calibration of reasonable DSGE models.
In the second part of the paper I have used recent survey evidence on price and wage durations for 15 European countries in order to study whether the predictions of the parsimonious theoretical model are in line with the existing empirical evidence. Using the assumption of Calvo wage contracts, the average model-based annual RWR comes out as 0.33 which is in line with existing empirical estimates. This seems to confirm in a broad sense the parsimonous explanation of RWR as a simple consequence of the interaction of two nominal rigidities. I have shown, however, that this apparent concordance breaks down on further investigation. First, the use of Taylor wage contracts leads to considerably lower levels of RWR. This decrease is further accentuated if one allows for the clustering of new wage contracts. Second, the model-based variation in RWR is much smaller than the one observed in the data. Third, the rankings of countries according to the model-based and to the empirical estmations do not correspond. All of this suggests that the EHL model omits important parts of the empirical reality. One might, e.g., argue that these shortcomings are related to differences in the importance of openness or to differences in financial and labor market institutions. This indicates important areas for future research. Current work in this direction (cf. Gertler et al., 2008; Abbritti and Weber, 2008 ) is promising to not only improve the dynamic properties of DSGE models but to also offer a framework for understanding cross-country differences in real wage rigidity. and thus δ = 1. In this case it thus holds that ω t = ω t−1 .
A.2 Solution to the model with Calvo wage contracts (section
2) A.2.1 Basic Solution
One can use the methods of undetermined coefficients to derive a solution of the following form:
The coefficient Ψ ω 1 thus gives the degree of real wage rigidity in a specification where one corrects for the realization of the two shocks a t and v t . It holds that Ψ (24) to (26) could as well be written in terms of deviation of ω t from its flexible-prices-no-shocks valueω n : π
A.2.2 Solution in terms of ω t−1 , a t andỹ t
Using (25) v t can be expressed in terms ofỹ t :
. Inserting this in (24) and (26) equilibrium inflation and the equilibrium real wage can be written just in terms of the past real wage (ω t−1 ), the output gap (ỹ t ) and a supply shock (a t ) which corresponds loosely to a specification one can frequently find in the empirical literature:
The degree of RWR used in the text is defined as δ
. The other coefficients used in equation (17) are:
.
A.2.3 Error Correction Form
One can also transform the solution to derive an error-correction form that is similar to various specifications that can be found in the theoretical and empirical literature. As a starting point, note that (3) can be rewritten (using (26)) as:
From this one can derive an expression for E t π w t+1 . Using this together with (9) and (10) in (2) it follows:
Wage inflation thus depends on expected future price inflation (E t π p t+1 ), on the output gap (ỹ t ), on the technology and interest rate shocks (a t and v t ) and on the error-correction 24 It can be easily seen that only if the restrictions on Ψ term (ω t−1 −ω n ), i.e. the deviation of the past real wage ω t−1 from the flexible-prices-noshocks valueω n . Substituting in (29) for v t one can again derive an error-correction form just in terms of E t π p t+1 , a t ,ỹ t and (ω t−1 −ω n ):
In the text equation (30) is used as equation (23) where the coefficients Φ 1 , Φ 2 and Φ 3 are defined accordingly. Equation (30) is a form that corresponds closely to the empirical counterparts. In fact this equation is parallel to equation (6) 25 in Blanchard and Katz (1999) . The coefficient of the error-correction-term depends in a rather complicated way on all parameters of the model. Note that one can write, however:
In a similar vein one could express also the other coefficients in terms of Ψ One can also derive an equation that is fairly close to the traditional Phillips curve formulation. First, lag (24) by one period and then use (ω t−1 −ω n ) = Ψ Again one can use (25) (and a lagged version of (25)) to express v t and v t−1 in terms of the other variables. It follows:
This corresponds to equation (18) in the text.
A.3 Solution to the model with Taylor wage contracts (section 3)
A.
The wage-setting equation
There is no explicit treatment of the model with Taylor contracts in Galí (2008) . 26 It is, however, straightforward to derive a wage-setting equation following analogous steps as in Galí (2008, chap. 6 .1.2.1). Instead of equation (10) in chapter 6 the two-period Taylor model implies the following optimal wage-setting equation (for sector i ∈ {A, B} that is allowed to choose a new wage in period t):
One can also follow Galí (2008) and defineμ . The marginal rate of substitution is given by (11) and thus one can also write:
Using other definitions and transformations one can also derive thatμ
. Thus another equivalent expression is:
This formulation is used in the text as equation (19) .
The average wage in period t is the weighted average of the two sectoral wages, i.e.:
The rest of the model is the same as in the standard case.
A.3.2 Basic Solution
One can again use the method of undetermined coefficients to derive a solution of the form: 
A.3.3 The period-on-period and year-on-year RWR in terms of v t
The solutions can be used to derive an expression for the real wage ω
Since the coefficients might be different across the two sectors also the reaction of ω 
Note that the coefficient Γ ωi 1 that determines the extent of (year-on-year) rigidity of the sectoral real wage is the same in both sectors:
For comparisons across models and across countries etc. one is, however, not so much interested in the rigidity of the sectoral real wage but in the rigidity of the average real wage given by: 
Following similar steps one can derive a parallel expression forω
:
Note that the (year-on-year) rigidity of the average real wage is the same in both periods, independent of which sector sets the new wages. It is given by Γ ω 1 . Note, however, that the reaction of the average real wage to supply shocks and monetary policy shocks is different in the two subperiods. And note also that the average real wage also depends on current and past inflation rates.
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A.3.4 A Phillips curve (in terms of v t )
One can again also derive a expression that is similar to a backward-looking Phillips curve. (34) and (35) 
29
This is the same result as in the case of the standard model where the coefficient of RWR (26) is the same as the one of past inflation in the backward looking Phillips curve (see (32)).
A.3.5 Real wage rigidity and a Phillips curve (in terms ofỹ t )
For the sake of comparison it is sometimes better to express all relations in terms ofỹ t instead of v t . One can use (36) to write
From this it follows that:
This equation corresponds to (38), the only difference is that it is specified in terms of ω The standard models with Calvo and with Taylor wage contracts is based on a structure where the basic time unit corresponds to one semester. In the two-period Taylor model this implies that a wage contract lasts for one year (=two semesters). This assumption has been primarily made for convenience and in order to be able to deal with the case of asymmetric sector sizes in a coherent and comprehensible way. The assumption differs, however, from the related literature where the basic time unit is normally defined as one quarter (which is in line with the frequency of the available macroeconomic data). When calibrating the model I had to be careful to choose the correct parameter values.
E.g., in the baseline case I have used a discount rate of β = 0.98 and a price adjustment probability of (1−θ p ) = 1/3 which implies an average price duration of
=1.5 semesters (or 270 days) which is a common value in the related literature (cf. Galí, 2008) .
Despite the identical average duration of price and wage contracts it is nevertheless clear that the choice of the basic time unit has an effect on the dynamic properties of the model. In particular, a system where changes of prices and wages are always possible will imply higher persistence (for the same average contract duration) than a system where changes are only allowed on a quarterly or semiannually frequency. In order to study the extent of this effect I have solved the basic models under the assumption of shorter basic time units.
For the model with Calvo wage contracts this has been straightforward since it only involves some reparameterizations. In particular, if f requ denotes the length of the basic time unit (measured in days), the structural parameter that corresponds to an average contract duration of x days is given by:
, where x ≥ f requ. The time discount rate is given by β = 0. estimation where the rate of inflation π t is regressed on the year-on-year lagged inflation π t−2 and measures for the output gap and the supply shocks for all intermediate periods (i.e. from a t to a t−2 and fromỹ t toỹ t−2 ). As shown in (45) the coefficient on π t−2 is equal toδ and the estimated regression coefficient on π t−2 should thus give an accurate estimation of RWR. I have simulated 50.000 data points (assuming ρ a = 0 = ρ v = 0 and σ a = σ v = 1) and ran a regression like that. The result is plotted as the orange line in Figure 7 , together with the exact (i.e. analytically derived) measure (red line) given byδ (as given in (46)). The two lines are indistinguishable.
Insert Figure 7 about here
Taking the regression results for the two-period model as a suggestive starting point I have also solved the Taylor model with 4 and with 12 subperiods.
31 I have then again simulated a large number of datapoints and I have run regressions that allow me to infer the degree of RWR. In particular, these regressions are of the form: 
The results are plotted in Figure 7 . They are qualitatively similar to the case of Calvo wage contracts, although now the underestimation of RWR due to a longer basic time unit is somewhat larger. Compared to the RWR in the case of a monthly frequency of potential price changes it is 78% (semester) and 17% (quarter). The bias again decreases for larger price durations. In drawing Figures 6 and 7 I have kept the length of the wage contract constant (at 360 days). For this assumption the figures illustrate that for both the case with calvo and with Taylor contracts the choice of the basic time unit does not affect the ranking of countries. This might, however, change once one compares countries that differ both in their duration of prices and of wages. In the next section and in part 4 of the paper I say more on this issue.
B.2 Accounting for different durations of wage contracts in the two-period Taylor model
The standard two-period Taylor model fixes the average duration of wage contracts at two semesters=one year. In order to be able to use the simple two-period framework also for cross-country comparisons and to allow for longer or shorter average wage durations it is necessary to make some adaptions. I use a straightforward method to make these adjustments that is based on the idea to take the average duration of wage contracts dur from the data and define f requ = , where x stands for the average duration of price contracts (in days) and x ≥ f requ. Using these values one can then follow the same steps as in chapter A.3 to calculate a valueδ as a measure of period-to-period RWR. The annual RWR can then be derived fromδ higher RWR. As one can observe from Figure 8 this requirement is in fact borne out by the method described above as long as the average price duration is not too much shorter than the average wage duration. Assuming, e.g., that the two nominal variables are characterized by the same average duration one gets RWRs equal to 0.05, 0.14, 0.28 and 0.38 when the duration is 270, 360, 540 and 720 days, respectively. On the other hand, one sees that if this condition about the relative duration is not fulfilled then one might get erroneous results. If, e.g., wage agreements are written for two years while prices last on average for less than one year then the approximate method would imply a RWR of zero, which is obviously wrong. The data used for the cross-country comparisons, however, do not show such vast discrepancies in relative duration for most countries. On the other hand, Figure 8 also suggests that the procedure is less tahn perfect and that country rankings might change if the difference between the two durations is too large.
One should thus best regard it as an approximate method that is helpful to make countries with different wage durations comparable.
33
33 Needless to say that a model based on monthly basic time units would allow for more accurate results. Such a finer timing structure is, however, computationally rather involved, especially in as far as asymmetric sector sizes are concerned. 34 It is interesting to note that for the baseline case with δ * = 0.54 the 34 Using the Spearman rank correlation coefficient changes the values to -0.08 (for the large interval) and -0.30 (for the small interval).
value for Ψ ω 5 is almost zero. This corresponds to the literature on the NKPC where it is often found that the coefficient of real marginal costs (or the output gap) is very small. 
C.2 The degree of RWR and the speed of adjustment
Equation (23) and (30) (in the appendix) show the error-correction form that follows from the EHL model. 35 The size of Φ 1 is illustrated in Figure 10 .
Insert Figure 10 about here Φ 1 decreases in θ w . For flexible wages (θ w = 0) one gets that Φ 1 = 1. For the baseline case (with θ p = 1/3, θ w = 1/2) the coefficient of the error-correction-term is Φ 1 = 0.28.
Furthermore, there exists a negative relation between the measure of real wage rigidity δ * and the error-correction term Φ 1 . This is illustrated in Figure 11 .
Insert Figure 11 about here
The negative correlation between Φ 1 and δ * is perfect for identical θ p or θ w . The correlation is -0.47 (for θ p ∈ [0, 1]) and -0.72 (θ p ∈ [0.1, 0.9]). 36 Note that for δ * = 0 one gets that Φ 1 = 1.
35 In empirical specifications one can alternatively find a measure for the error-correction-term given by ω t−1 − ω n t . A formulation like this does not follow directly from the EHL model. It can be estimated, however, using simulated data. The results (not reported) are similar to the ones that use equation (23) . 36 The Spearman rank correlation coefficients are -0.42 and -0.66, respectively. A comparison of the exact magnitudes of Φ 1 in Figures 10 and 11 to the existing empirical literature is again problematic. Not only, because the empirical estimations are based on different specifications but also because the coefficient of the ECM refer specifically to the precise time structure of the model (semesters in the present case).
C.3 The degree of RWR and the sacrifice ratio
A precise measure for the sacrifice ratio cannot be derived in the framework of the basic model since a disinflation involves a new steady state and for this one cannot use the log-linearized system (cf. Ascari and Ropele, 2009) . In order to see how different degrees of real rigidity affect the costs of adjustment to macroeconomic shocks I use a measure that is somewhat related to the sacrifice ratio. For this, I calculate the ratio of the sum of the deviations of the output gap to the sum of the deviations of the inflation rate after a one-period (monetary policy) shock. In particular, I denote byỹ IRF the impulse response to the output gap in period t + i after a one-unit shock to v in period t. The variable π IRF is defined in a parallel way. The sacrifice ratio for the cumulative impulse responses up to period t + T is then defined as:
A scatterplot in Figure 12 shows the positive correlation for various degrees of nominal price rigidity. The correlation between this (somewhat sloppy) sacrifice ratio and δ * is 0.27 (for θ p ∈ [0, 1]).
37
Insert Figure 12 about here 37 The Spearman rank correlation coefficients is 0.67.
